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growing economies. From 1979 to 2007 China’s real gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average 
annual rate of 9.8%. Real GDP grew 11.4% in 2007 (the fastest annual growth since 1994). While China is 
expected to continue to enjoy rapid economic growth in the years ahead and could become the world’s 
largest economy within a decade or so, it faces a number of challenges, including widespread corruption, 
an inefficient banking system, over-dependence on exports and fixed investment for growth, pollution, 
widening income disparities, and growing inflationary pressures. The Chinese government has indicated 
that it intends, over the coming years, to create a “harmonious society” that would promote more 
balanced economic growth and address a number of economic and social issues. Trade and foreign 
investment continues to play a major role in China’s booming economy. From 2004 to 2007, the value of 
total Chinese merchandise trade nearly doubled. In 2007, China’s exports (at $1,218 billion) exceeded U.S. 
exports (1,162 billion) for the first time. China’s imports were $956 billion and its trade surplus was $262 
billion (a historic high). Well over half of China’s trade is conducted by foreign firms operating in China. 
The combination of large trade surpluses, foreign direct investment flows, and large-scale purchases of 
foreign currency have helped make China the world’s largest holder of foreign exchange reserves at $1.5 
trillion at the end 2007. China’s economy continues to be a concern to many U.S. policymakers. On the 
one hand, U.S. consumers, exporters, and investors have greatly benefitted from China’s rapid economic 
and trade growth. On the other hand, the surge in Chinese exports to the United States has put 
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does not play by the rules when it comes to trade and they have called for greater efforts to pressure 
China to fully implement its World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments and to change various 
economic policies deemed harmful to U.S. economic interests, such as its currency policy, its use of 
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China’s rising demand for energy and raw materials, its impact on world prices for such commodities, 
increased pollution levels, and efforts China has made to invest in energy and raw materials around the 
world, including countries (such as Iran, North Korea, and Sudan) where the United States has political 
and human rights concerns. This report provides an overview of China’s economic development, 
challenges China faces to maintain growth, and the implications of China’s rise as a major economic 
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China’s Economic Conditions
Summary
Since the initiation of economic reforms in 1979, China has become one of the
world’s fastest-growing economies.  From 1979 to 2007 China’s real gross domestic
product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of 9.8%.  Real GDP grew 11.4% in
2007 (the fastest annual growth since 1994). While China is expected to continue to
enjoy rapid economic growth in the years ahead and could become the world’s largest
economy within a decade or so, it faces a number of challenges, including
widespread corruption, an inefficient banking system, over-dependence on exports
and fixed investment for growth, pollution, widening income disparities, and growing
inflationary pressures.  The Chinese government has indicated that it intends, over
the coming years, to create a “harmonious society” that would promote more
balanced economic growth and address a number of economic and social issues. 
Trade and foreign investment continues to play a major role in China’s booming
economy.  From 2004 to 2007, the value of total Chinese merchandise trade nearly
doubled. In 2007, China’s exports (at $1,218 billion) exceeded U.S. exports (1,162
billion) for the first time.  China’s imports were $956 billion and its trade surplus was
$262 billion (a historic high).  Well over half of China’s trade is conducted by
foreign firms operating in China.  The combination of large trade surpluses, foreign
direct investment flows, and large-scale purchases of foreign currency have helped
make China the world’s largest holder of foreign exchange reserves at $1.5 trillion
at the end 2007.  
China’s economy continues to be a concern to many U.S. policymakers.  On the
one hand, U.S. consumers, exporters, and investors have greatly benefitted from
China’s rapid economic and trade growth.  On the other hand, the surge in Chinese
exports to the United States has put competitive pressures on various U.S. industries.
Many U.S. policymakers have argued that China often does not play by the rules
when it comes to trade and they have called for greater efforts to pressure China to
fully implement its World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments and to change
various economic policies deemed harmful to U.S. economic interests, such as its
currency policy, its use of subsidies to support state-owned firms, trade and
investment barriers to U.S. goods and services, and failure to ensure the safety of its
exports to the United States.  Concerns have also been raised over China’s rising
demand for energy and raw materials, its impact on world prices for such
commodities, increased pollution levels, and efforts China has made to invest in
energy and raw materials around the world, including countries (such as Iran, North
Korea, and Sudan) where the United States has political and human rights concerns.
This report provides an overview  of China’s economic development, challenges
China faces to maintain growth, and the implications of China’s rise as a major
economic power for the United States.  This report will be updated as events warrant.
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China’s Economic Conditions
The rapid  rise of China as a major economic power within a time span of about
30 years is often described by analysts as one of the greatest economic success stories
in modern times.  From 1979 (when economic reforms began) to 2007, China’s real
gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of over 9.8%; in 2007,
it rose by 11.4%.  The Chinese economy in 2007 (in real terms) was nearly 14 times
larger than it was in 1979, and real per capita GDP was more than 10 times larger.
By some measurements, China is now the world’s second largest economy and some
analysts predict it could become the largest within a decade or two.
China’s economic rise has led to a substantial increase in U.S.-China economic
relations.  Total trade between the two countries surged from $5 billion in 1980  to
and estimated $389 billion in 2007.  For the United States, it is estimated that in
2007, China was its 2nd largest trading partner, its 3rd largest export market, and its
largest source of imports.  Many U.S. companies have extensive manufacturing
operations in China in order to sell their products in the booming Chinese market and
to take advantage of low cost labor for manufacturing products for export.  These
operations have helped U.S. firms remain internationally competitive and have
supplied U.S. consumers with a variety of low cost goods.  China’s large-scale
purchases of U.S. Treasury securities have enabled the federal government to fund
its budget deficits and  keep U.S. interest rates relatively low. 
However, the emergence of China as a major economic superpower has raised
concern among many U.S. policymakers.  Some express concern over the large and
growing U.S. trade deficits with China, which have risen from $10.4 billion in 1990
to $256 billion in 2007, and are viewed by many Members as an indicator that U.S.-
Chinese commercial relations are imbalanced or unfair.  Others claim that China uses
unfair trade practices (such as an undervalued currency and subsidies to domestic
producers) to flood U.S. markets with low cost goods, and that such practices
threaten American jobs, wages, and living standards.  Congressional concerns over
perceived negative China’s economic practices have led to the introduction of
numerous bills in the 110th Congress, some of which would impose restrictions on
imported Chinese products.
While most economists contend China will continue to experience rapid
economic growth over the next several years, they note that it faces a number of
significant challenges, including a weak banking system, widening income gaps,
growing pollution, unbalanced economic growth (through over-reliance on exports),
and widespread economic efficiencies resulting from non-market policies.  
This report provides background on China’s economic rise and current
economic structure and the challenges China faces to keep its economy growing
strong, and describes Chinese economic policies that are of concern to U.S.
policymakers.  
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Most Recent Developments
! On March 10, 2008, the Bank of China reported the exchange rate
between the yuan and the dollar at 7.11.  The government also
reported that China’s imports and exports in February 2008 rose by
35.1% and 6.5% respectively over the same month in 2007.  China’s
exports to the United States were down 5.3% while imports from the
United States jumped 47.8%.
! On February 19, 2008, the Chinese government reported that the
consumer price index (CPI) had risen by 7.1% in January 2008 over
the same month in 2007, and the CPI for foodstuff was up 18.2%,
raising concerns in China that inflation could threaten future
economic growth.1
! On January 24, 2008, the Chinese government reported that real
GDP grew by 11.4% in 2007 over the previous year, the highest rate
of growth since 1994.  In addition, exports hit $1.2 trillion. 
! On September 29, 2007, the Chinese government officially launched
the China Investment Corporation (under the direction of the State
Council) in an effort to better manage its foreign exchange reserves.
It reportedly will initially manage over $200 billion, making it one
of the world’s largest state-owned funds.
! On June 29, 2007, the Chinese National People’s Congress passed
a new contract labor law intended to improve labor rights and stop
abuses (such as unpaid labor and forced overtime).  The law passed
two weeks after the Chinese media reported that government raids
had uncovered evidence that hundreds of people (including many
children) had been forced to work as virtual slaves in illegal brick
kilns and coal mines in northern China.  China’s Xinhua News
Agency stated that reports of such abuses have “sparked a
nationwide outcry.”2  
! On June 22, 2007, the Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency announced that, according to its estimates, China in 2006
became the world’s largest emitter  of CO2, surpassing the United
States by 8%.
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An Overview of China’s Economic Development
China’s Economy Prior to Reforms
Prior to 1979, China maintained a centrally planned, or command, economy.
A large share of the country’s economic output was directed and controlled by the
state, which set production goals, controlled prices, and allocated resources
throughout most of the economy.  During the 1950s, all of China’s individual
household farms were collectivized into large communes.  To support rapid
industrialization, the central government undertook large-scale investments in
physical and human capital during the 1960s and 1970s.  As a result, by 1978 nearly
three-fourths of industrial production was produced by centrally controlled state-
owned enterprises according to centrally planned output targets.  Private enterprises
and foreign-invested firms were nearly nonexistent.  A central goal of the Chinese
government was to make China’s economy relatively self-sufficient.  Foreign trade
was generally limited to obtaining only those goods that could not be made or
obtained in China.
Government policies kept the Chinese economy relatively stagnant and
inefficient, mainly because there were few profit incentives for firms and farmers;
competition was virtually nonexistent, and price and production controls caused
widespread distortions in the economy.  Chinese living standards were substantially
lower than those of many other developing countries.  The Chinese government
hoped that gradual reform would significantly increase economic growth and raise
living standards.
The Introduction of Economic Reforms
Beginning in 1979, China launched several economic reforms.  The central
government initiated price and ownership incentives for farmers, which enabled them
to sell a portion of their crops on the free market.  In addition, the government
established four special economic zones along the coast for the purpose of attracting
foreign investment, boosting exports, and importing high technology products into
China.  Additional reforms, which followed in stages, sought to decentralize
economic policymaking in several sectors, especially trade.  Economic control of
various enterprises was given to provincial and local governments, which were
generally allowed to operate and compete on free market principles, rather than under
the direction and guidance of state planning.  Additional coastal regions and cities
were designated as open cities and development zones, which allowed them to
experiment with free market reforms and to offer tax and trade incentives to attract
foreign investment.  In addition, state price controls on a wide range of products were
gradually eliminated.
China’s Economic Growth Since Reforms:  1979-Present
Since the introduction of economic reforms, China’s economy has grown
substantially faster than during the pre-reform period (see Table 1).   From 1960 to
1978, real annual GDP growth was estimated at 5.3% (a figure many analysts claim
is overestimated, based on several economic disasters that befell the country during
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this time, such as the Great Leap Forward from 1958-1960 and the Cultural
Revolution from 1966-1976).  During the reform period (1979-the present), China’s
average annual real GDP grew by 9.8%; it grew by an estimated 11.4% in 2007 over
the previous year.  Since economic reforms were begun, the size of the economy in
real terms has increased 14-fold, and real per capita GDP (a common measurement
of living standards) has gone up 10-fold.3 
Table 1.  China’s Average Annual Real GDP Growth:  1960-2007
Time 
Period
Average Annual 
Growth (%)
1960-1978 (pre-reform) 5.3
1979-2007 (post-reform) 9.8
1990 3.8
1991 9.3
1992 14.2
1993 14.0
1994 13.1
1995 10.9
1996 10.0
1997 9.3
1998 7.8
1999 7.6
2000 8.4
2001 8.3
2002 9.1
2003 10.0
2004 10.1
2005 9.9
2006 11.1
2007 11.4
Source:  Official Chinese government data and Economist Intelligence Unit. 
Causes of China’s Economic Growth
Economists generally attribute much of China’s rapid economic growth to two
main factors:  large-scale capital investment (financed by large domestic savings and
foreign investment) and rapid productivity growth.  These two factors appear to have
gone together hand in hand.  Economic reforms led to higher efficiency in the
economy, which boosted output and increased resources for additional investment in
the economy.
China has historically maintained a high rate of savings.  When reforms were
initiated in 1979, domestic savings as a percentage of GDP stood at 32%.  However,
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most Chinese savings during this period were generated by the profits of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), which were used by the central government for domestic
investment.  Economic reforms, which included the decentralization of economic
production, led to substantial growth in Chinese household savings (these now
account for half of Chinese domestic savings).  As a result, savings as a percentage
of GDP has steadily risen; it reached nearly 50% in 2005, among the highest savings
rates in the world.
Several economists have concluded that productivity gains (i.e., increases in
efficiency in which inputs are used) were another major factor in China’s rapid
economic growth.  The improvements to productivity were caused largely by a
reallocation of resources to more productive uses, especially in sectors that were
formerly heavily controlled by the central government, such as agriculture, trade, and
services.  For example, agricultural reforms boosted production, freeing workers to
pursue employment in the more productive manufacturing sector.  China’s
decentralization of the economy led to the rise of nonstate enterprises, which tended
to pursue more productive activities than the centrally controlled SOEs.
Additionally, a greater share of the economy (mainly the export sector) was exposed
to competitive forces.  Local and provincial governments were allowed to establish
and operate various enterprises on market principles, without interference from the
central government.  In addition, foreign direct investment (FDI) in China brought
with it new technology and processes that boosted efficiency.
China’s Industrial Sector
China’s rapid economic growth has largely come from the expansion of its
industrial manufacturing.  As seen in Table 2, the total value-added output of all
manufacturing rose by over 178% between 1995 and 2003.  In 2003, the industries
with the largest value-added output were electrical machinery, industrial chemicals,
transport equipment, iron and steel, and non-electrical machinery (such as
computers).  An important factor in China’s rapid economic rise has been the decline
of the state-owned or controlled enterprises relative to the private sector and foreign-
owned enterprises.  Before the 1979 reforms, state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
accounted for about three-fourths of total industrial value-added output.  In 2005, that
share had declined to about 38%.  About 28% of the valued-added industrial output
came from foreign-invested firms in China and 18% from private Chinese
companies.  The rest came from locally owned town and village enterprises and
various enterprises jointly owned by the state and private companies.  According to
the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the number of  SOEs fell from 118,000 in
1995 to 27,477 in 2005.4  According to some estimates, Chinese SOEs have shed
over 60 million of workers since 1998.  Many SOEs have been transferred into state
holding companies, which, while mainly state-owned, are run like private companies
(and many of which are listed in various stock exchanges overseas, including in the
United States). 
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the industries in China still dominated by SOEs (in 2003) include tobacco
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processing (SOEs control 98.6% of value added output), petroleum and natural gas
extraction (93.8%), coal mining (81.4%), petroleum processing and coking (77.3%),
smelting and pressing of ferrous metals (63.1%), and transport equipment (63.1%).5
Table 2.  Major Chinese Industries Based on  
Value-Added Output: 1995 and 2003
($ millions and % change)
1995 2003 1995/2003% Change
Total Manufacturing 148,059 411,846 178.2
Electrical machinery 14,834 66,521 348.4
Industrial chemicals 16,888 45,727 170.8
Transport equipment 9,641 35,000 263.0
Iron and steel 12,612 34,119 170.5
Non-electrical machinery 13,401 31,395 134.3
Food products 8,476 25,776 204.1
Textiles 10,758 23,036 114.1
Tobacco 7,335 19,010 159.2
Other non-metallic mineral products (such as
china, pottery, earthenware, and glass products) 10,776 16,334 51.6
Petroleum refineries 6,721 15,554 131.4
Source:  2006 China Statistical Yearbook.  
Measuring the Size of China’s Economy
The actual size of the China’s economy has been a subject of extensive debate
among economists.  Measured in U.S. dollars using nominal exchange rates, China’s
GDP in 2007 was $3.3 trillion; its per capita GDP (a commonly used living-standards
measurement) was $2,510.  Such data would indicate that China’s economy and
living standards are significantly lower than those of the United States and Japan,
respectively considered to be the number-one and number-two largest economies (see
Table 3).
Many economists, however, contend that using nominal exchange rates to
convert Chinese data into U.S. dollars substantially underestimates the size of
China’s economy.  This is because prices in China for many goods and services are
significantly lower than those in the United States and other developed countries.
Economists have attempted to factor in these price differentials by using a purchasing
power parity (PPP) measurement, which attempts to convert foreign currencies into
U.S. dollars on the basis of the actual purchasing power of such currency (based on
surveys of the prices of various goods and services) in each respective country.  This
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 In December 2007, the World Bank lowered its previous estimate of China’s 2005 GDP
on a PPP basis by 40% (to $5.3 trillion), based on price survey data supplied by the Chinese
government for the first time.  The new PPP estimates are believed to be more accurate than
those made previously.  See CRS Report RS22808, How Large is China’s Economy? Does
it Matter? By Wayne M. Morrison and Michael F. Martin.
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 In 2005, China announced that previous year’s FDI data excluded investment in the
banking, insurance, and securities sectors.  It henceforth began to report two overall FDI
figures: one that includes the financial sector and one that excludes it.  China’s FDI
including the financial sector totaled $72.4 billion in 2005, $69.5 billion in 2006, and $82.7
billion in 2007.  China does not include the financial sector in its country breakdown of FDI.
PPP exchange rate is then used to convert foreign economic data in national
currencies into U.S. dollars.
 Because prices for many goods and services are significantly lower in China
than in the United States and other developed countries (while prices in Japan are
higher), the PPP exchange rate raises the estimated size of Chinese economy from
$3.3 trillion (nominal dollars) to $7.2 trillion (PPP dollars), significantly larger than
Japan’s GDP in PPPs ($4.3 trillion), and a little over half the size of the U.S.
economy.  PPP data also raise China’s per capita GDP from $2,510 (nominal) to
$5,420.  The PPP figures indicate that, while the size of China’s economy is
substantial, its living standards fall far below those of the U.S. and Japan.  China’s
per capita GDP on a PPP basis was only 11.82% of U.S. levels.  Thus, even if
China’s GDP were to overtake that of the United States in the next few decades, its
living standards would likely remain substantially below those of the United States
for many years to come.6
Table 3.  Comparisons of U.S., Japanese, and Chinese GDP and
Per Capita GDP in Nominal U.S. Dollars and PPP, 2007
Country
Nominal GDP
($ billions)
GDP in PPP
($ billions)
Nominal Per
Capita GDP
Per Capita
GDP in PPP
United States 13,843 13,843 45,820 45,820
Japan 4,384 4,270 34,460 33,500
China 3,316 7,168 2,510 5,420
Source:  Economist Intelligence Unit (estimated, based on World Bank Data). 
Foreign Direct Investment in China
China’s trade and investment reforms and incentives led to a surge in foreign
direct investment (FDI), which has been a major source of China’s capital growth.
Annual utilized FDI in China (excluding the financial sector) grew from $636 million
in 1983 to $75 billion in 2007.7  The cumulative level of FDI in China at the end of
2007 stood at nearly $760 billion, making China one of the world’s largest
destinations of FDI. 
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 Communications equipment, computers, and other electronic equipment accounted for the
largest manufacturing sector for FDI.
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 Xinhua News Agency, August 28, 2007.
Based on cumulative FDI for 1979-2007 about 40% of FDI in China has come
from Hong Kong,  9.7% from the British Virgin Islands,8 8.1% from Japan, and 7.4%
from the United States.  (See Table 4).9  The United States was China’s 5th largest
source of U.S. FDI in 2007, accounting for 3.5% of total.10  U.S. FDI flows to China
peaked at $5.4 billion in 2002, but have declined every year since.   U.S. FDI in
China in 2007 fell by nearly 13% over the previous year.
The largest sector for FDI flows to China in 2007 was manufacturing, which
accounted for about 55% of total (see Table 5).11  The Chinese government estimates
that through June 2007, it had approved over 610,000 foreign funded companies and
that 28 million people were employed by such firms (10% of all people employed in
urban areas).12
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Table 4.  Major Foreign Investors in China:  1979-2007
($ billions and % of total)
Country
Cumulative Utilized FDI:  
1979-2007 Utilized FDI in 2007
Amount % of Total Amount
% of
Total
%
Change
over
2006
Total 760.2 100.0 74.8 100.0 13.4
Hong Kong 300.0 39.5 20.2 37.1 30.0
British Virgin Islands 73.8 9.7 16.6 22.1 41.8
Japan 61.2 8.1 3.6 4.8 -24.6
United States 56.6 7.4 2.6 3.5 -12.8
Taiwan 45.7 6.0 1.8 2.4 -20.4
South Korea 38.7 5.1 3.7 4.9 -7.9
Source:  Invest in China, [http://www.fdi.gov.cn].  Top six investors according to cumulative FDI
from 1979 to 2007.  Data do not reflect FDI in the financial sector, which the government does not
report by country.
Note:  Chinese data on FDI differ significantly from that of investor countries.  
Table 5. Foreign Direct Investment by Sectors in 2007
($ billions and % of total) 
Sectors UtilizedFDI
%  of 
Total
Total $74.8 100% 
Manufacturing 40.9  54.6  
Real Estate Development 17.1 23.7  
Leasing and Commercial Services 4.0 5.3  
Wholesale and Retail Trade 2.7 3.6  
Transport, Storage, and Posts 2.0 2.7  
Source: Chinese National Bureau of Statistics.
China’s Trade Patterns
Economic reforms have transferred China into a major trading power. Chinese
exports rose from $14 billion in 1979 to $1,218 billion in 2007, while imports over
this period grew from $16 billion to $956 billion (see Table 6).  In 2004, China
surpassed Japan as the world’s third-largest trading economy, after the European
Union (EU) and the United States, and in 2007 it may have become the second
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largest exporter, surpassing the United States.  China’s exports has grown
dramatically in recent years, doubling in size from 2004 to 2007, with an average
annual growth rate of 29%.  Imports over this period increased by 70%.  China’s
trade surplus, which totaled $32 billion in 2004, surged to $262 billion in 2007. 
Table 6.  China’s Merchandise World Trade, 1979-2007
($ billions)
Year Exports Imports TradeBalance
1979 13.7 15.7 -2.0
1980 18.1 19.5 -1.4
1985 27.3 42.5 -15.3
1990 62.9 53.9 9.0
1995 148.8 132.1 16.7
2000 249.2 225.1 24.1
2001 266.2 243.6 22.6
2002 325.6 295.2 30.4
2003 438.4 412.8 25.6
2004 593.4 561.4 32.0
2005 762.0 660.1 101.9
2006 969.1 791.5 177.6
2007 1,218.0 955.8 262.2
Source:  International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics
and Global Trade Atlas (using official Chinese statistics).
Merchandise trade surpluses, large-scale foreign investment, and large purchases
of foreign currencies to maintain its exchange rate with the dollar and other
currencies have enabled China to accumulate the world’s largest foreign exchange
reserves.  China’s accumulation of foreign exchange reserves has been particularly
acute over the past few years.  China’s total reserves reached $1.5 trillion at the end
of December 2007.  
China’s Major Trading Partners
China’s trade data often differ significantly from those of its major trading
partners, especially with the United States.  This is largely due to the large share of
China’s trade (both exports and imports) passing through Hong Kong (which reverted
back to Chinese rule in July 1997 but is treated as a separate customs area by most
countries, including China and the United States).  China treats a large share of its
exports through Hong Kong as Chinese exports to Hong Kong for statistical
purposes, while many countries that import Chinese products through Hong Kong
generally attribute their origin to China for statistical purposes. 
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According to Chinese trade data, its top five trading partners in 2007 were the
European Union (EU), Japan, the United States, the 10 nations that constitute the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Hong Kong (see Table 7).
China’s largest export markets were, the EU, the United States, and Hong Kong,
while its top sources for imports were the Japan, the EU, and ASEAN (the United
States ranked 6th).  China maintained substantial trade surpluses with the United
States, the EU, and Hong Kong, but had deficits with Japan and ASEAN.  China
reported that it had a $163 billion trade surplus with the United States (U.S. data
show that it had a $256 billion deficit with China).
U.S. trade data indicate that the importance of the U.S. market to China’s export
sector is likely to be much higher than is reflected in Chinese trade data.  Based on
U.S. data on Chinese exports to the United States and Chinese data on total Chinese
exports, it is estimated that Chinese exports to the United States as a share of total
Chinese exports totaled 33.6% in 2007.  A growing level of Chinese exports is from
foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs) in China.  According to Chinese data, FFEs were
responsible for 57% of Chinese exports in 2007 compared with 41% in 1996.  A
large share of these FFEs are owned by Hong Kong and Taiwan investors, many of
whom have shifted their labor-intensive, export-oriented, firms to China to take
advantage of low-cost labor.  A large share of the products made by such firms is
likely exported to the United States. 
Table 7.  China’s Major Trading Partners:  2007
($ billions)
Country Total Trade ChineseExports
Chinese
Imports
China’s
Trade
Balance
European Union 356.2 245.2 111.0 134.2
United States 302.1 232.7 69.4 163.3
Japan 236.0 102.1 134.0 -31.9
ASEANa 202.5 94.2 108.4 -14.1
Hong Kong 197.2 184.3 12.8 171.6
Source: China Monthly Statistics.
Note:  Chinese data on its bilateral trade often differ substantially from the official trade data of many
of its trading partners.
a. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), and Vietnam.
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 Rankings and classification descriptions differ according to what tariff classification
system is used and at what digit level.  HTS digit levels range from two to ten.  To illustrate,
on a 2-digit HTS level, China’s top five exports in 2007 were electrical machinery,
machinery, knit apparel, woven apparel, and iron and steel. China’s top imports on a 2-digit
level were electrical machinery; machinery; optical, photographic, cinematographic,
measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus, and parts and
accessories; and ores. 
Major Chinese Trade Commodities
China’s abundance of cheap labor (the average labor cost per hour in China was
$1.35, compared with $24.50 in the United States in 2006)13 has made it
internationally competitive in many low-cost, labor-intensive manufactures.  As a
result, manufactured products constitute an increasingly larger share of China’s trade.
A substantial amount of China’s imports is comprised of  parts and components that
are assembled in Chinese factories (major products include consumer electronic
products and computers), then exported.  China’s top 10 exports and imports in 2007
are listed in Tables 8 and 9, respectively, using the harmonized tariff system (HTS)
on a four digit level.14
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Table 8.  Top 10 Chinese Exports:  2007
HS # Description
Exports
($billions)
%  of
Total
Exports 
2006-2007 
 % Change
Total Exports  1,218.0 100.0 25.7
 8471 Automatic data processing
machines and units thereof;
magnetic or optical readers,
machines for transcribing and
processing coded data, NESOI 93.5 7.7 0.5
 8517 Electric apparatus for line
telephony etc, parts 78.6 6.5 566.2
 8528 Television receivers, including
video monitors and video
projectors 36.2 3.0 182.4
 8473 Parts etc for typewriters and other
office machines 32.7 2.7 -0.9
 8542 Electronic integrated circuits and
micro-assemblies; parts thereof 24.0 2.0 11.1
 9013 Liquid crystal devices nesoi,
lasers, optical appliances and
instruments, and parts 20.6 1.7 39.2
8443 Printing machinery used for
printing by means of plates,
cylinders and other printing
components; other printers,
copying machines and facsimile
machines, whether or not
combined; parts and accessories
thereof: printing machinery used
for printing by means of
plates, cylinders and other
printing components 18.7 1.5 4,548.1
6110 Sweaters, pullovers, and vests,
etc, knit or crocheted 16.0 1.3 24.8
8504 Electrical transformers, static
converters (for example,
rectifiers) and inductors; parts 14.2 1.2 29.1
6204 Women’s or girls’ suits,
ensembles, etc. not knit 13.4 1.1 7.8
Source: World Trade Atlas.
Notes:  Harmonized Tariff, four-digit level.  NESOI means not elsewhere specified or included.
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Table 9.  Top 10 Chinese Imports:  2007
HS # Description
Value
($billions)
%  of
Total
2006-2007
% Change 
 Total  995.8 100.0 20.8
 8542 Electronic integrated circuits and
micro-assemblies; parts thereof 129.5 13.5 20.8
 2709 Crude oil from petroleum and
bituminous minerals 79.7 8.3 20.0
 9013 Liquid crystal devices NESOI; lasers;
optical appliances and instruments
NESOI; parts and accessories thereof 45.2 4.7 25.9
 2601 Iron ores and concentrates 33.8 3.5 62.5
 8471 Automatic data processing machines
and units thereof; magnetic or optical
readers, machines for transcribing and
processing coded data, NESOI 20.0 2.1 0.5
8517 Electric apparatus for line telephony
etc, and parts 18.8 2.0 416.5
 8473 Parts etc for typewriters & other office
machines 17.5 1.8 -8.7
 8529 Parts for television, radio and radar
apparatus 19.7 2.5 18.8
 2710 Oil (not crude) from petrol and
bituminous mineral etc. 16.3 1.7 5.0
 8541 Diodes, transistors and similar devices;
photosensitive semiconductor devices;
light-emitting diodes; mounted
piezoelectric crystals; parts thereof 15.6 1.6 18.7
1201 Soybeans 11.5 1.2 53.1
Source: World Trade Atlas.
Notes:  Harmonized Tariff, four-digit level.  NESOI means not elsewhere specified or included.
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 For additional information on policy challenges posed by North Korea, see CRS Report
RL33590, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by Larry A.
Niksch; and CRS Report RL32493, the North Korean Economy: Leverage and Policy
Analysis, by  Dick K. Nanto, Emma Chanlett-Avery.  For information on policy challenges
posed by Sudan, see CRS Report RL33574, Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the
North-South Peace Agreement, by Ted Dagne.
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insurance, and freight (C.I.F.) basis.  The C.I.F.  basis differs from the customs basis in that
the former includes the cost of insurance and freight and thus raises the value of imports
(which the customs basis does not), by about 10%.  
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 Central Intelligence Agency, the 2008 World Factbook.
China’s Growing Economic Ties with 
Africa, North Korea, and Iran
China has sought to expand its trade with countries around the world, especially
those that posses energy and raw materials China needs to sustain its rapid economic
growth, such as those in Africa.  Although China’s trade with these countries is
relatively small (compared with its major trading partners), it is growing rapidly.
China is also a major trading partner of various countries that pose challenges to U.S.
foreign policy, such as Iran, Sudan, and North Korea.15 
China-Africa Trade
China’s Imports From Africa. China’s imports from Africa as a percent of
its total imports grew from 2.8% in 2004 to 3.8% in 2007 (to $36.3 billion).16  As a
whole, Africa was China’s 7th largest source of imports in 2007.  China’s imports
from Africa grew by 25.9% over the previous year (compared to total Chinese
imports growth of 20.8%).  Mineral fuels were by far China’s largest import from
Africa, accounting for 72% of total imports.  Angola was China’s largest source of
imports from Africa, accounting for 35% of those imports in 2007, followed by
South Africa, Sudan, the Congo, and Equatorial Guinea. China’s imports from Sudan
were up 112% over the previous year (see Tables 10 and 11). In 2006, China was
Sudan’s largest source of imports (18.2% of total).17
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Table 10.  Top Five African Sources of Chinese Imports: 
2004-2007
($ millions)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2006-2007 % Change
Africa Total 15,641 21,114 28,768 36,330 25.9
Angola                   4,718 6,581 10,931 12,885 17.9
South Africa             2,955 3,444 4,095 6,608 61.4
Sudan                    1,706 2,615 1,941 4,114 111.9
Congo                    1,569 2,278 2,785 2,828 1.6
Equatorial Guinea    995 1,486 2,538 1,697 -33.1
Source: World Trade Atlas.  Official Chinese statistics.
Table 11.  Top Five Chinese Imports from Africa: 2004-2007
($ millions and %)
HS 2 Commodity
Description 2004 2005 2006 2007
%  of
Total
2007
2006-2007
% Change
Mineral fuel, oil, etc 10,135 14,676 21,083 25,997 71.8 23.3 
Ores, slag, ash 1,393 1,577 2,116 3,298 9.1 55.9
Precious stones and
metals 742 967 1,196 1,358 3.8 13.5
Wood 473 524 705 915 2.5 29.8
Iron and steel 439 475 315 851 2.4 170.6
Source: World Trade Atlas. Official Chinese statistics.
China’s Mineral Fuel Imports From Africa.  Africa has become an
imported source of China’s surging energy needs.  In 2007, 72%  of China’s imports
from Africa were mineral fuels.  China’s fuel imports from Africa rose from $10.1
billion in 2004 to $26.0 billion in 2007.  In 2007, Africa supplied 24.8% of China’s
imported mineral fuels (compared with 9.1% in 1997).  Angola was China’s second
largest overall mineral fuel supplier and its largest African supplier.  Other major
African suppliers (and the world rank) of mineral fuel to China were Sudan (7th), the
Congo (12th), Equatorial Guinea (18th), and Libya (19th) (see Table 12).
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Table 12.  Top Five African Suppliers of Mineral Fuel to China: 
2007
Country Imports($millions)
Rank as a Supplier
of Mineral Fuel to
China
Angola 12,876 2
Sudan 4,086 7
Congo 2,307 12
Equatorial Guinea 1,566 18
Libya 1,528 19
Africa Total 25,997  — 
Source: Global Trade Atlas.
China’s Exports to Africa.  The share of Chinese exports going to Africa
rose from 2.3% in 2004 to 3.1% in 2007 (to $37.3 billion).18  If Africa were treated
as a single trading partner, it would rank as China’s 7th largest export market in 2007.
Exports to Africa grew by 39.7% over the previous year (compared to China’s total
exports growth of 25.7%).  Major Chinese exports to Africa in 2007 included
electrical machinery, machinery (such as computers and components), vehicles
(mainly motorcycles and trucks), apparel, and iron and steel products.  The top five
African destinations of Chinese exports in 2007 were South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria,
Algeria, and Morocco (see Tables 13 and 14).  In 2006, China was Sudan’s second
largest export market (31% of total).19
Table 13.  China’s Top Five African Export Markets: 2004-2007
($ millions)
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2006-2007% Change
Africa Total 13,815 18,687 26,705 37,314 39.7
South Africa 2,952 3,826 5,769 7,429 28.8
Egypt 1,389 1,935 2,976 4,432 48.9
Nigeria 1,719 2,305 2,856 3,800 33.1
Algeria 981 1,405 1,952 2,709 48.8
Morocco 944 1,206 1,570 2,162 37.8
Source: World Trade Atlas.  Official Chinese statistics.
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Table 14.  Top Five Chinese Exports to Africa:  2004-2007
($ millions)
HS 2 Commodity
Description 2004 2005 2006 2007
%  of
Total
2007
2006- 2007
% Change 
Electrical machinery
and parts*
1,905 2,799 4,122 5,806 15.6 40.9
Machinery, mechanical
appliances, and parts
1,374 2,141 3,220 4,517 12.1 40.3
Vehicles (excluding
railway)
936 1,448 2,023 3,165 8.5 56.4
Knit apparel 828 938 1,537 2,940 7.9 91.3
Iron/steel products 654 903 1,225 1,920 5.1 56.7
Source: World Trade Atlas. Official Chinese statistics.
*Includes, electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers,
television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles.
China’s Trade with North Korea
 China is North Korea’s largest trading partner and a major supplier of foreign
aid (largely in the form of food and fuel).20  In 2007, Chinese exports to, and imports
from, North Korea totaled $1.4 billion and $582 million, respectively.  North Korea
was China’s 68th largest source of imports (0.06% of total) and its 68th largest export
market (0.11% of total).21  Chinese exports to North Korea rose by 13.0% and
imports were up 24.3%, over 2006 levels. China accounted for 37.3% of North
Korea’s exports and 39.8% of its imports (2005 data).22  According to Chinese data,
its top five exports to North Korea (2007) were oil, machinery,  electrical machinery
(such as TVs), plastics, and vehicles (see Table 15), while its top imports from North
Korea were ores, coal, woven apparel, fish, and iron and steel (see Table 16).  
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 China was the largest if EU countries are counted separately.
Table 15.  Major Chinese Exports to North Korea: 2004-2007 
($ millions and % change)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2006-/2007% Change
Total Exports  795 1,085 1,232 1,392 13.0
Mineral fuel, oil, etc. (mainly oil) 204 286 348 402 15.7
Machinery 40 77 83 104 25.0
Electrical machinery (such as TVs) 46 57 98 69 -29.0
Plastics 32 52 52 55 5.0
Vehicles (except railway) 18 28 28 54 92.1
Source:  World Trade Atlas.
Table 16.  Major Chinese Imports from North Korea: 2004-2007
($ millions and % change)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2006-2007%Change
 Total Imports 582 497 468 582 24.3
Mineral fuel, oil, etc. (mainly coal) 53 112 102 170 55.1
Ores, slag, and ash 59 92 118 164 38.5
Woven apparel 49 58 63 60 -4.7
Iron and steel 75 72 35 45 28.2
Fish and seafood 261 92 43 30 -30.8
Source:  World Trade Atlas.
China’s Trade With Iran
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China was  Iran’s largest
second trading partner, after EU in 2006.23   China was Iran’s 4th largest export
market (at $9.0 billion), and its 2nd largest source of imports (at $4.9 billion).   China
has become an increasingly important trading partner for Iran in recent years.  Iranian
exports to China as a share of its total exports rose from 9.7% in 2002 to 12.9% in
2006, while Iranian imports from China as a share of its total imports increased from
4.7% to 10.6%.
Iran constitutes a relatively minor, though growing, trading partner for China.
According to Chinese data, Iran was its 16th largest trading partner in 2007.  China’s
exports to, and imports from, Iran totaled $7.3 billion and $13.3 billion, respectively.
China’s exports to Iran rose by 62.1% and imports from Iran were up by 33.7%.
China’s top exports to Iran in 2007 were iron and steel ($1.6 billion), machinery
($1.1 billion), vehicles and parts ($880 million).  China’s imports from Iran were
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 The Iran Daily (July 25, 2007) contended that Iran had become China’s largest source of
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 The Chinese government is believed to be the largest shareholder in the company.
dominated by crude oil, which totaled $11.6 billion and constituted 87.2% of total
Chinese imports.  Iran was China’s 3rd largest source of mineral fuels imports in
2007; these constituted 11.1% of China’s total world oil of these products.24
According to press reports, China’s state-owned oil companies have signed oil and
gas deals with Iran worth over $100 billion.25 
China’s Growing Overseas Direct Investment
A key aspect of China’s economic growth strategy has been to attract foreign
investment into China.  However, in 2000, China’s leaders initiated a new “go
global” strategy, which sought to encourage firms (especially state-owned
enterprises) to invest overseas.  The Chinese government generally refers to these
activities as overseas direct investment (ODI).  There appears to be several factors
driving this investment:
! China’s massive accumulation of foreign exchange reserves has led
government officials to seek more profitable ways of investing these
holdings (which traditionally have mainly been put into relatively
safe, low yield assets, such as U.S. Treasury securities).  On
September 29, 2007, the Chinese government officially launched the
China Investment Corporation (under the direction of the State
Council) in an effort to better manage its foreign exchange reserves.
It reportedly will initially manage over $200 billion, making it one
of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds.  Some analysts believe
that China will increasingly use its reserves to purchase foreign
firms, or shares of foreign firms, that are perceived to be profitable.
! As a developing country, China has traditionally sought to attract
FDI into the country in order to, through joint ventures, gain access
to foreign technology and management skills to help domestic firms
become more efficient and internationally competitive.  Now the
Chinese government is attempting to promote the development  of
internationally recognized Chinese brands.  One strategy has been to
purchase (or attempt to purchase) existing companies and their
internationally-recognized brand names (as well as to obtain
technology and management skills).  For example, in April 2005
Lenovo Group Limited, a Chinese computer company, purchased
IBM Corporation’s personal computer division for $1.75 billion.26
On June 20, 2005, Haier Group, a major Chinese home appliances
manufacturer, made a $1.28 billion bid to take over Maytag
Corporation, although the bid was later withdrawn.
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 In terms of regions, Asia accounted for 71.0% of China’s ODI, followed by Latin America
(20.0%), Europe (2.8%), Africa (2.8%), North America (2.2%), and Oceania (1.1%).
! Acquisition of energy and raw materials has been a major priority of
China’s overseas investment strategy.  As such, China has sought to
either purchase or invest in foreign energy and raw material
companies,  infrastructure projects (such as oil and gas pipelines, oil
refineries, and mines), and joint ventures.27 For example, in June
2005, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC),
through its Hong Kong subsidiary (CNOOC Ltd.), made a bid to buy
a U.S. energy company, UNOCAL, for $18.5 billion, although
CNOOC later withdrew its bid due to opposition by several
congressional Members.  In August 2005, the China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China’s largest oil company,
purchased PetroKazakhstan Inc., a Canadian-registered company, for
$4.2 billion.28 According to the Eurasia Group, since the 1990s
CNPC has signed energy deals with Sudan worth $10 billion, with
$4 billion in actual investment.29   
China reported that its ODI (excluding the finance sector) totaled $16.1 billion
(up from $2.9 billion in 2003), up 32% over the previous year, and ranking it as the
world’s 13th largest investor.  Cumulative ODI totaled $73.3 billion,30 involving
10,000 approved outbound enterprises.31  One Chinese official estimated that annual
ODI flows could reach $60 billion, with a total cumulation of $120 billion by 2010.32
Table 17 lists the top 10 destinations for China’s cumulative ODI as of 2005.
Hong Kong was by far the major destination (accounting for 64%), followed by the
Cayman Island, the British Virgin Islands, South Korea, and the United States.33
Some analysts contend that much of the ODI going to Hong Kong and Caribbean
islands represents “round  tipping,” that is investment that is sent overseas but then
re-invested elsewhere (including China).  Some analysts suspect that some of that
capital could be going into tax havens.   
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Table 17.  Top 10 Destinations for China’s Overseas Direct
Investment: 2005
($ millions)
Country Cumulative FDI
Hong Kong 36,510
Cayman Islands 8,936
British Virgin Islands 1,984
South Korea 882
United States 823
Macau 599
Australia 587
Russian Federation 466
Sudan 352
Bermuda 337
Total Chinese ODI 57,200
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2006.
Major Long-Term Challenges Facing 
the Chinese Economy
China’s economy has shown remarkable economic growth over the past several
years, and many economists project that it will enjoy fairly healthy growth in the near
future.  However, economists caution that these projections are likely to occur only
if China continues to make major reforms to its economy.  Failure to implement such
reforms could endanger future growth. 
! An inflexible currency policy.  China does not allow its currency
to float and therefore must make large-scale purchases of dollars to
keep the exchange rate within certain target levels.  Although the
yuan has appreciated someone since reforms were introduced in July
2005, analysts contend that it remains highly undervalued against the
dollar.  Economists warn that China’s currency policy has made the
economy overly dependent on exports and fixed investment for
growth and has promoted easy credit policies by the banks.  These
policies may undermine long-term economic stability by causing
overproduction in various sectors, increase the level of non-
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Policy, by Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte.
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performing loans held by the banks (see below), and increase
inflationary pressures.34 
! State-owned enterprises (SOEs), which account for about one-
third of Chinese industrial production, put a heavy strain on China’s
economy.  Over half are believed to lose money and must be
supported by subsidies, mainly through state banks.  Government
support of unprofitable SOEs diverts resources away from
potentially more efficient and profitable enterprises.  In addition, the
poor financial condition of many SOEs makes it difficult for the
government to reduce trade barriers out of fear that doing so would
lead to widespread bankruptcies among many SOEs.  
! The banking system faces several major difficulties due to its
financial support of SOEs and its failure to operate solely on market-
based principles.  China’s banking system is regulated and
controlled by the central government, which sets interest rates and
attempts to allocate credit to certain Chinese firms.  The central
government has used the banking system to keep afloat money-
losing SOEs by pressuring state banks to provide low- interest loans,
without which a large number of the SOEs would likely go bankrupt.
Currently, over 50% of state-owned bank loans now go to the SOEs,
even though a large share of loans are not likely to be repaid.  The
precarious financial state of the Chinese banking system has made
Chinese reformers reluctant to open the banking sector to foreign
competition.  Corruption poses another problem for China’s banking
system because loans are often made on the basis of political
connections.  This system promotes widespread inefficiency in the
economy because savings are generally not allocated on the basis of
obtaining the highest possible returns. 
! Growing public unrest.  The Chinese government reported that
there were over 87,000 protests (many of which became violent) in
2005 (compared with 53,000 protests in 2003) over such issues as
pollution, government corruption, and land seizures.35  A number of
protests in China have stemmed in part from frustrations among
many Chinese (especially peasants) that they are not benefitting from
China’s economic reforms and rapid growth, and perceptions that
those who are getting rich are doing so because they have
connections with government officials. Protests have broken out
over government land seizures and plant shutdowns in large part due
to perceptions that these actions benefitted a select group with
connections.  A 2005 United Nations report stated that the income
gap between the urban and rural areas was among the highest in the
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world and warned that this gap threatens social stability.  The report
urged China to take greater steps to improve conditions for the rural
poor, and bolster education, health care, and the social security
system.36  
! The lack of the rule of law in China has led to widespread
government corruption, financial speculation, and misallocation of
investment funds.  In many cases, government “connections,” not
market forces, are the main determinant of successful firms in China.
Many U.S. firms find it difficult to do business in China because
rules and regulations are generally not consistent or transparent,
contracts are not easily enforced, and intellectual property rights are
not protected (due to the lack of an independent judicial system).
The lack of the rule of law in China limits competition and
undermines the efficient allocation of goods and services in the
economy.  Recent reports of slave labor in northern China has also
raised public anger over the lack of enforcement of labor laws.
! Poor government regulatory environment.  China maintains a
weak and relatively decentralized government structure to regulate
economic activity in China.  Laws and regulations often go
unenforced or are ignored by local government officials.  As a result,
many firms cut corners in order to maximize profits.  This has lead
to a proliferation of unsafe food and consumer products being sold
in China or exported abroad.37  Growing concerns over the health
and safety of Chinese products (such as fish, petfood, tires, and toys)
in the United States and other countries could lead consumers to
reduce their purchases of Chinese products and could undermine
China’s efforts to develop and promote internationally recognized
Chinese brands.
! Growing pollution.  The level of pollution in China continues to
worsen, posing series health risks to the population.  The Chinese
government often disregards its own environmental laws in order to
promote rapid economic growth.  According to the World Bank, 20
out of 30 of the world’s most polluted cities are in China, with
significant costs to the economy (such as health problems, crop
failures and water shortages). According to one government
estimate, environmental damage costs the country $226 billion, or
10% of the country’s GDP, each year.  The Chinese government
estimates that there are over 300 million people living in rural areas
that drink unsafe water (caused by chemicals and other
contaminants).  Toxic spills in 2005 and 2006 threatened the water
supply of millions of people.
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In October 2006, the Chinese government formally outlined its goal of  building
a “harmonious socialist society” by taking steps (by 2020) to lessen income
inequality, improve the rule of law, beef up environmental protection, reduce
corruption, and improve the country’s social safety net (such as expanding health care
and pension coverage to rural areas).  In March 2007, the Chinese National People’s
Congress (NPC) passed a law to strengthen property laws to help prevent local
governments from unfairly seizing land from farmers, and in June it passed a new
labor contract law to enhance labor rights.  In addition, the government has
scrambled to improve health and safety laws and regulations.   
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The short-term outlook for the Chinese economy appears to be positive, but it
will likely be strongly influenced by the government’s ability to reform the SOEs and
banking system to make them more responsive to market forces, increase the
flexibility of its exchange rate policy, and to assist workers who lose their jobs due
to economic reforms (in order to maintain social stability).  Global Insight, an
economic forecasting firm, projects that China’s real GDP will average 7.8% over
the next 10 years, indicating that China could double the size of its economy in less
than 10 years.  Real GDP is projected to rise by 10.9% in 2008.39 
China’s rise as an economic superpower is likely to pose both opportunities and
challenges for the United States and the world trading system.  China’s rapid
economic growth has boosted incomes and is making China a huge market for a
variety of goods and services.  In addition, China’s abundant low-cost labor has led
multinational corporations to shift their export-oriented, labor-intensive
manufacturing facilities to China.  This process has lowered prices for consumers,
boosting their purchasing power.  It has also lowered costs for firms that import and
use Chinese-made components and parts to produce manufactured goods, boosting
their competitiveness.  Conversely, China’s role as a major international
manufacturer has raised a number of concerns.  Many developing countries worry
that growing FDI in China is coming at the expense of FDI in their country.
Policymakers in both developing and developed countries have expressed concern
over the loss of domestic manufacturing jobs that have shifted to China (as well as
the downward pressures on domestic wages and prices that may occur from
competing against low-cost Chinese-made goods).  
Many analysts contend that China’s currency policy (despite reforms undertaken
in 2005 and the yuan’s gradual appreciation), is having a negative impact on the
economies of many of its trading partners (including the U.S.) by artificially making
its exports cheaper, and imports more expensive, than they would be under a floating
system.  They have urged China to move toward a floating exchange rate regime as
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soon as possible, contending that such a move would benefit China’s economy and
those of its trading partners.40  For example, China’s accumulation of large foreign
exchange reserves has forced it to increase the money supply, which may eventually
lead to inflationary pressures on the economy.41  In addition, many analysts contend
that easy money policies have led to over-investment in certain economic sectors.
However, Chinese officials have expressed concern that further currency reforms, if
implemented too quickly, could prove disruptive to the economy.  A number of bills
have been introduced in the 110th Congress to address Chinese currency policy,
including some that would impose sanctions against China.
China is attempting to establish and promote companies that can compete
globally, especially in advanced technologies.  In some cases, China has attempted
to purchase large foreign companies.  China’s possession of large currency reserves
and desire to become a world leader in the production of a variety of goods and
strategic commodities will likely lead the Chinese government to expand efforts to
take over major international corporations.  Many Members charge that China’s use
of extensive subsidies to support state-owned firms threatens U.S. economic interests
and may violate its WTO commitments.  
 China’s rapid economic growth and continued expansion of its manufacturing
base are fueling a sharp demand for energy and raw materials, which is becoming an
increasingly important factor in determining world prices for such commodities.
China is now the world’s second largest consumer of oil products (after the United
States) at 6.9 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2006, and that level is projected to rise
to 13.4 million bpd by 2025.42  The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)
predicted that nearly 40% of world oil demand growth in 2006 would come from
China.43  China’s net oil imports in 2006 totaled 2.8 million bpd (up 16.8% over the
previous year) and those imports are projected to rise to 10.9 million bpd by 2030.
China’s energy needs has become a central part of its foreign policy.  
Obtaining energy supplies has become a major focus of China’s foreign policy.
This has increased concerns among U.S. policymakers for a number of reasons.
First, China is becoming increasingly dependent on oil producers in the Persian Gulf
region.  Currently, China gets about 32% of its oil imports from the region, but by
2030, that level is projected to rise to 53%.  This could induce China to become
increasingly involved in Middle East affairs.  In addition, China is  actively involved
in gaining greater access to energy in Africa, where it gets nearly a third of its oil
imports.  Angola was China’s 2nd largest source of oil in 2006.  Second, instead of
just buying oil in international markets, China has increasingly sought to purchase
or invest in foreign oil companies, production facilities, pipelines, oil fields, and
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refineries around the world.44  Finally, China’s thirst for oil has led it to obtain
agreements with countries the United States has major human rights and foreign
policy concerns with (such as Iran and Sudan).  Many U.S. policymakers are
concerned that China’s energy needs will lead it to oppose U.S. foreign policy
objectives and that this could result in increased tensions between the United States
and China.
A growing concern over China’s energy use and rising demand is the possible
global environmental consequences.  According to one estimate, one-third of the air
pollution in the West Coast of the United States comes from China.45  China’s
pollution levels are expected to significantly worsen.  For example, according to the
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), China in 2004 was the world’s
second-largest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (at 4.7 billion metric tons)
after the United States, and constituted 17% of total world emissions (comparted to
22% for the United States).  EIA predicts that by the year 2010, China will become
the world’s largest emitter, and that by the year 2030, China’s emissions will be 41%
greater than U.S. levels.46  The Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency
estimates that China was in fact the largest CO2 emitter in 2006.47
Some U.S. policymakers have expressed concern over China’s rising ownership
of U.S. government debt, due to fears that China might attempt to use its holdings as
leverage in its dealings with the United States on economic and/or political matters.
China is the second largest foreign holder of Treasury securities (after Japan), and
both the level of those holdings and China’s share of total foreign holdings have
increased sharply over the past few years.  These went from $51.8 billion in 1999 to
$388.6 billion at end of November 2007.48  China’s U.S. Treasury securities holdings
as a share of total foreign holdings over this period have grown from 4.1% to 16.6%.
Some have raised concerns that threats by China to halt future purchases, or to sell
existing holdings, could cause the value of the dollar to depreciate in world markets
(raising import prices), increase U.S. interest rates, lead to a decline in U.S. stock and
bond markets, and possibly cause the U.S. economy to slow.  However, any such
disruption to the U.S. economy would also hurt China’s economy since about a third
of China’s exports go to the United States.49
